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GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS: WHEN DO THEY BECOME 
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE? 
ABSTRACT 
Government payments received by a debtor postpetition are often tied to 
prepetition events, presenting the issue of whether a legal or equitable interest 
existed as of the commencement of the case under § 541 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. The Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a debtor 
has no legal or equitable interest in a government payment until the legislation 
authorizing the payment is signed into law. These decisions, however, failed to 
articulate a clear standard, as evidenced by recent case law. 
The issue of when a government payment becomes property of the estate 
has been particularly contentious in the crop disaster payment context. A new 
program, the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Program (SURE), presents a 
novel fact pattern. In SURE, the Secretary of Agriculture must designate the 
county where a crop was lost as a disaster county before a farmer can qualify 
for payment. Therefore, when a bankruptcy petition is filed, payment may still 
be contingent upon an act within the agency’s discretion. 
This Comment will argue that a government payment becomes property of 
the estate when the payment is “absolutely owed,” meaning the payment is no 
longer contingent in any way. First, the case law reveals no clear standard as 
to when a government payment becomes property of the estate under § 541. 
The right to setoff in § 553 has a clearer rule, a contrast that can help guide 
analysis. Second, recent cases regard the statutory authorization date as 
determinative, but this approach runs contrary to the Code and relevant case 
law, for §§ 541 and 553 require a more nuanced factual inquiry. Third, 
administrative law dictates that a government payment becomes an entitlement 
for purposes of due process when legal sources create enforceable standards 
that guide an agency’s discretion. This standard should control when agency 
discretion is an issue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Once a debtor obtains a legal or equitable interest in a government 
payment, two sections of the Bankruptcy Code (Code) are at play. The first is 
§ 541(a) of the Code, which governs when property becomes part of the 
bankruptcy estate.1 The second is § 553, which preserves a creditor’s right to 
offset an obligation to a debtor against the debtor’s obligation to the creditor.2 
In deciding whether postpetition government payments were property of the 
estate, courts initially took an expansive view, concluding that debtors have a 
legal or equitable interest in a government payment as long as the loss or event 
to which the payment is tied to occurred prepetition. Courts reached this result 
even when legislation authorizing the payment was passed postpetition. In the 
past ten years, the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have narrowed 
this expansive interpretation of § 541, and have held that a debtor has no legal 
or equitable interest in a government payment until the legislation authorizing 
the payment is signed into law.3 These decisions, however, fail to articulate a 
clear standard. 
Analysis of recent cases reveals that the lack of a clear standard has led 
courts to produce inconsistent holdings, often concluding that a debtor does not 
have a legal or equitable interest in a government payment until the statutory 
authorization date.4 This approach runs contrary to the Code, which requires a 
more nuanced factual inquiry.5 Under § 541(a) courts should analyze the 
government payment program and the facts of the case to determine if all the 
conditions necessary for the payment to be a legal or equitable interest 
occurred prepetition.6 Importing the language from the right to setoff set forth 
in § 553, the payment must be “owing” at the time of the petition in order for a 
creditor to possess the right to setoff.7 Using such language in the context of 
§ 541(a) analysis is useful because it emphasizes the necessary factual inquiry 
courts must engage in under both provisions.  
 
 1 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).  
 2 Id. § 553.  
 3 See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes (In 
re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 507 (5th Cir. 2006); Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1026‒27 (8th Cir. 
2002); Sliney v. Battley (In re Schmitz), 270 F.3d 1254, 1255 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 4 See generally In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012). 
 5 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 553. 
 6 See id. § 541(a). 
 7  See generally id. § 553. 
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If a court engages in the necessary factual inquiry, it may encounter unique 
factual wrinkles. One government payment program, the Supplemental 
Revenue Assistance Program (SURE), is an illustrative example. The SURE 
program provides assistance to farmers who have lost crops due to a natural 
disaster.8 Under SURE, the Secretary of Agriculture must designate the county 
where the crop was lost as a disaster county before the farmer can qualify for 
payment.9 Therefore, at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed, payment may 
still be contingent upon an act within the agency’s discretion.10 The novel 
factual issue presented by this program is whether a government payment is 
property of the estate when a government agency has discretion over a 
qualification requirement at the time of the bankruptcy petition. 
When the mechanics of a government payment program pose an issue of 
agency discretion, bankruptcy courts should look to administrative law. 
Administrative law dictates that a government payment becomes an 
entitlement for purposes of due process when legal sources create enforceable 
standards that guide an agency’s discretion.11 This standard should be adopted 
when determining whether a government payment is property of the estate. 
This Comment will argue that a government payment becomes property of the 
estate when it is “absolutely owed,” meaning all contingencies for payment are 
satisfied, including when enforceable standards remove an agency’s discretion.  
I. BACKGROUND 
To determine exactly when a government payment becomes “absolutely 
owing,” a court must engage in a factual inquiry of the government payment 
program at issue, and apply the mechanics of the program to the facts of the 
case. The SURE program provides an illustrative example of how a court 
would conduct this analysis, including discussion of the relevant statutes and 
regulations. It also demonstrates how novel issues can arise when a court 
engages in a close factual analysis of a government payment program. In 
particular, SURE presents the problem of agency discretion over a condition 
 
 8 Farm Serv. Agency, Fact Sheet, Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments (SURE) Program, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., 1 (Jan. 2011), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/sure_2011.pdf. 
 9 Id. at 1–2. 
 10 See Motion to Lift Stay and For Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 2012); 
Emergency Designation News Release, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Dec. 2010), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/ 
newsReleases?area=newsroom&subject=landing&topic=edn&newstype=ednewsrel&type=detail&item=ed_20
101201_rel_0128.html [hereinafter News Release] (declaring forty-two counties in North Carolina as Primary 
Natural Disaster Areas should provide aid for affected farmers). 
 11 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577‒78 (1972).  
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necessary for payment. This issue arises when a Secretarial Disaster 
Designation has yet to be made at the time of the petition. 
Historically, most crop disaster payment programs have been either 
permanently funded and immediately available through successive Farm Bills 
or authorized by Congress as patchwork relief after a natural disaster 
occurred.12 SURE is a relatively new crop disaster payment program 
authorized by the 2008 Farm Bill.13 Eligibility is dependent upon the farmer 
holding the Farm Service Agency (“USDA”) crop insurance for the relevant 
crop year as well as a documented qualifying crop loss.14 A 10% qualifying 
loss is required if the farmer’s land is located in a Designated Secretarial 
Disaster County (designated by the Secretary of Agriculture), or a 50% 
qualifying loss if the land is located in a non-Designated Secretarial Disaster 
County.15 
In the SURE program, an eligible producer can receive a payment equal to 
60% of the difference between the targeted level of revenue and the actual total 
revenue received during the relevant crop year.16 To find the targeted level of 
revenue, USDA calculates the average market price of the crop over the course 
 
 12 DENNIS A. SHIELDS & RALPH M. CHITE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21212, AGRICULTURAL DISASTER 
ASSISTANCE 1 (2010). The areas it covers include crop subsidies, international trade, rural development, food 
safety, and environmental conservation. The USDA disaster payment programs relating to crop loss that enjoy 
regular Farm Bill funding include NAP (Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program), and Emergency Farm 
Loans. Id. at 2‒3, 6‒7. 
 13 Id. at 4. Funding is allocated for the 2008–2011 crop years. See generally Definition of Crop Year, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cropyear.asp#axzz2Lkq1mjZl (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) 
(A crop year is defined as “[t]he time period from one year’s harvest to the next for an agricultural commodity. 
Crop year varies for each commodity . . . [and] has an influence on the price of a commodity, since the quality 
of the harvest may differ from year to year.”). In December of 2012, Congress extended the 2008 Farm Bill for 
nine months, effectively funding the SURE program for the 2012 crop year. See David Rogers, Fiscal Cliff 
Deal Includes Farm Bill Extension, POLITICO (last updated Jan. 12, 2013, 10:23 AM), http://www.politico. 
com/story/2013/01/fiscal-cliff-deal-include-farm-bill-extension-85641.html. 
 14 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 8. A “qualifying crop production loss” is a term used in the various 
crop disaster assistance programs to indicate the loss at issue has an eligible producer, an eligible crop, and 
loss stemming from an eligible natural disaster. An eligible producer must be a landowner, tenant or 
sharecropper who shares in the risk of producing a crop. An eligible crop is a commercially produced crop, 
grown for food, livestock production or some other agricultural purpose. An eligible natural disaster includes 
damaging weather such as drought or floods, adverse natural occurrences or a condition relating to damaging 
weather such as excessive heat. Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments (SURE) Program Backgrounder, 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 1‒4 (Jan. 2011), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/sure_bkgder_122309.pdf 
[hereinafter SURE Backgrounder]. 
 15 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 8.  
 16 SHIELDS & CHITE, supra note 12, at 4. 
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of the relevant crop year.17 The calculation of actual total revenue takes into 
account the direct and counter-cyclical USDA payments the farmer received, 
actual crop revenue received, and any insurance indemnities received.18 
USDA’s direct and counter-cyclical payments, or crop subsidies, are calculated 
based on a farmer’s acreage and the type of crop grown.19 The exact, direct, or 
counter-cyclical payment due per acre varies significantly between various 
types of crop.20 This method of calculation means that the amount a farmer is 
due under SURE may be zero, particularly when the type of crop lost is heavily 
subsidized.21 In summary, the SURE payment, in simplified form, looks 
something like this: 
SURE Payment = [Targeted Revenue – Actual Revenue] x .60 
Targeted Revenue = crop revenue based on average market price + 
crop insurance payment 
Actual Revenue = actual crop revenue + direct/counter-cyclical  
payments + insurance indemnities.22 
The average market price of a crop over the course of a crop year, also 
called the crop marketing period, takes approximately seven months to 
calculate from the end of the crop year.23 The crop year ends at the conclusion 
of a particular commodity’s primary harvesting period.24 Due to the time delay 
necessary to gather the relevant market information, the SURE application 
periods open up approximately one year after the close of the crop marketing 
period.25 
Eligibility for a SURE payment typically hinges on whether the applicant 
farmer’s land and destroyed crops are located in a Secretarial Designated 
 
 17 Id. The targeted level of revenue also takes into account the level of crop insurance coverage selected 
by the farmer, thereby increasing the SURE payment if the farmer selects a higher level of coverage. Id. 
 18 SURE Backgrounder, supra note 14, at 1–2.  
 19 Id. at 2. 
 20 Direct and Counter-Cyclical Program and Average Crop Revenue Election Program: Crop Years 
2008‒2012, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 1 (Dec. 2011), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/fce_dcp_rates_ 
chart.pdf. 
 21 See id.; SURE Backgrounder, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
 22 See SURE Backgrounder, supra note 14, at 4–6. 
 23 See Understanding USDA Crop Forecasts, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 15–16 (Mar. 1999), http://www.nass. 
usda.gov/Education_and_Outreach/Understanding_Statistics/pub1554.pdf. 
 24 INVESTOPEDIA, supra note 13.  
 25 SHIELDS & CHITE, supra note 12, at 4.  
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Disaster County.26 As previously mentioned, the 2008 Farm Bill makes SURE 
relief available for farmers located in these disaster counties if they experience 
a 10% qualifying loss.27 Because this threshold is low, it effectively makes 
relief available to a vast number of farmers. The process by which the 
Secretary of Agriculture determines which counties have experienced a natural 
disaster affecting a given crop year was first set forth in a USDA promulgated 
regulation at 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20.28 
The original process set out in § 1945.20 first required the request of a 
natural disaster designation to be made by the Governor or Tribal Council of 
the afflicted county.29 Next, the USDA National Office notified the appropriate 
USDA State Director, who was responsible for investigating the physical crop 
losses experienced in the requested county.30 The USDA State Director was 
then to provide a formal recommendation in the form of a written report.31 
Upon receiving the State Director’s report, the National Office added 
additional crop yield information and sent the final report to the Secretary of 
Agriculture for use in making a decision on the requested natural disaster 
designation.32 This entire process typically took somewhere between a few 
months to a year.33 For example, all Secretarial Designated Disaster Counties 
for the 2010 crop year were made by May 3, 2011.34 
On July 13, 2012, a new rule creating a new expedited process was issued 
in the Federal Register, striking down 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20 for all designations 
made on or after July 12, 2012.35 The expedited process resolves two issues.36 
It provides for automatic designation if emergency drought levels are 
reached.37 If emergency drought levels are not reached, then the prior 
designation process is still applicable with one important change: the new 
 
 26 Id. 
 27 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
 28 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20 (2009) (current version at 7 C.F.R. § 759 (2013)).  
 29 Id. § 1945.20(b). 
 30 Id. § 1945.20(b)(1)(ii). 
 31 Id. § 1945.20(b)(1)(iii). The State Director was also authorized to complete any surveys necessary to 
gather information on the extent of the alleged disaster. Id. § 1945.20(b)(2)(iv). 
 32 Id. § 1945.20(b)(3). 
 33 See Farm Service Agency, Secretarial Designations – SURE 2010 Disaster Incidents – Final Report, 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (May 3, 2011), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/sure_2010gis_final050311 
pd.pdf.  
 34 Id.  
 35 Disaster Designation Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,248, (proposed July 13, 2012) (to be codified 7 C.F.R. 
§ 759). 
 36 Id. at 41,248, 41,250. 
 37 Id. 
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disaster designation procedure removes the requirement that a Governor or 
Tribal Council must first request the designation, and permits the USDA State 
Director or Secretary of Agriculture to initiate an investigation 
independently.38 Although the significance or efficacy of this change has yet to 
be seen, in theory it should speed up the designation process and give USDA 
the ability to independently initiate the designation process when it sees fit.39 
Under SURE, farmers are not “absolutely owed” payment until they (1) 
experience a qualifying loss, and (2) the Secretary of Agriculture designates 
the county through the process described in 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20, or the 
expedited process in 7 C.F.R. § 759.40 The designation under § 759 is largely 
the same as under § 1945.20, unless “extreme” drought levels are reached, 
which makes the designation automatic.41 The novel issue of agency discretion 
over a condition necessary for payment arises when the crop is lost prepetition, 
yet the county where the crop was lost has yet to obtain a Secretarial Disaster 
Designation when the debtor farmer files a bankruptcy petition. Stated 
generally, the issue is, can a debtor have a legal or equitable interest in a 
government payment, so as to be “absolutely owing,” when agency discretion 
exists over a necessary qualifying condition at the time of the bankruptcy 
petition? This searching inquiry into the mechanics of SURE is illustrative of 
the factual analysis a court must engage in to determine when a government 
payment is “absolutely owed” to the debtor. It also demonstrates the novel 
issue of agency discretion that may arise. 
II. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE UNDER § 541 
When a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy, a bankruptcy estate is created 
that serves as a means of repaying creditors.42 The section of the Code that 
defines and limits the bankruptcy estate is § 541.43 Subsection (a)(1) is a broad 
provision, stating that a bankruptcy estate consists of “all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”44 The 
bankruptcy estate therefore includes almost any asset or interest of value the 
debtor has at the time of filing, a broad reading that is strongly supported by 
 
 38 7 C.F.R. § 759.6 (2012).  
 39 Disaster Designation Process, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,248, (July 13, 2012) (to be codified 7 C.F.R. § 759). 
 40 See 7 C.F.R. §§ 759, 1945.20 (2009). 
 41 See 7 C.F.R. § 759.5 (2013). 
 42 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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the legislative history of the Code.45 Generally, § 541(a)(1) allows the debtor 
to keep property acquired postpetition, preserving the debtor’s opportunity for 
a fresh start.46 Subsection (a)(6), however, expands upon the definition 
provided in (a)(1) by bringing within the bankruptcy estate “proceeds . . . of or 
from property of the estate.”47 In bankruptcy cases in which the debtor has or 
may receive government payments, creditors frequently make two alternative 
arguments: that a payment received postpetition is either property of the estate 
under § 541(a)(1) or proceeds of property of the estate under § 541(a)(6).48 
Based on a court’s interpretation of the word “proceeds” and the term 
“legal or equitable interest,” either argument can be effective.49 On one hand, 
the court could determine that a government payment program created a legal 
interest in the payment at some point prepetition.50 On the other hand, 
bankruptcy courts can also determine a postpetition payment is “proceeds” of 
or from property of the estate.51 Because the Code is interpreted broadly, 
property of the estate can even include dead crops, making crop disaster 
payments “proceeds” of the debtor’s prepetition, albeit useless, property.52 
Although the Code indicates that government payments received 
postpetition can be property of the bankruptcy estate under § 541, it remains 
unclear at exactly what point and under what line of reasoning such payments 
become property of the estate. Analysis of the case law shows that courts 
initially took an expansive view, concluding debtors have a legal or equitable 
interest in a government payment as long as the loss or event to which the 
payment is tied to occurred prepetition.53 Courts reached this result even when 
 
 45 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6004. 
 46 See Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 47 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6). Even when a bankruptcy court finds a crop disaster payment to be “proceeds” 
within the meaning of § 541(a)(6), the payment still must be “property of the estate” as defined in § 541(a)(1). 
This requirement is due to the language of § 541(a)(6), which states the bankruptcy estate includes 
“proceeds . . . of or from property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (emphasis added). Therefore 
§ 541(a)(6) expressly incorporates the definition of property of the estate provided in § 541(a)(1).  
 48 See Burgess, 438 F.3d at 496‒97; Drewes v. Lesmeister (In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 923 (D.N.D. 
1999). 
 49 See Burgess, 438 F.3d at 496. 
 50 See Id. at 498‒99; Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 923‒24. Claims that are contingent, unliquidated or 
unmatured are property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) as long as the debtor has a prepetition legal right or 
interest. See Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 924‒25. 
 51 See Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos), 243 B.R. 96, 101 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999), abrogated by In re 
Stallings, 290 B.R. 777 (D. Idaho 2003). 
 52 See Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 924 (citing Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), 169 B.R. 73, 77 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 
1993), aff’d, 160 B.R. 692 (M.D. Ga. 1993)); Ring, 169 B.R. at 77. 
 53 See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.  
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the authorizing legislation was passed postpetition. In the past ten years, the 
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have cut back on this expansive 
interpretation of § 541, and held that a debtor has no legal or equitable interest 
in a government payment until the legislation authorizing the payment is 
signed into law.54 These decisions created one clear rule, but failed to articulate 
an overarching standard. 
The relevant case law can be organized into three basic fact patterns. The 
first occurs when both the authorizing legislation is passed prepetition, and the 
debtor files an application to participate in the government payment program 
prepetition. The second category consists of cases in which the authorizing 
legislation is passed prepetition, but the debtor does not file an application to 
participate until after the bankruptcy petition. Finally, the third category of 
cases features both postpetition legislation authorizing the program, and a 
postpetition application on the part of the debtor.55 Discussion of the case law 
organized into these factual “buckets” highlights different reasoning schemes 
that bankruptcy courts use when trying to determine when a debtor obtains a 
legal right to a government payment. It also highlights the need for a clear 
standard to guide the analysis of when a government payment becomes 
property of the estate. 
A. Prepetition Legislation and Prepetition Application Date 
At first glance it seems like this factual category should present little to no 
issue in the context of § 541(a) analysis. However, § 541 arguments can still 
arise when agency approval of a debtor’s application does not occur until after 
the date of the bankruptcy petition.56 This factual pattern therefore emphasizes 
when a legal right or interest in a government payment may form as between 
three dates in time: the date of the debtor’s application, the date the agency 
approves the debtor’s application, or the date of contract formation.57 
 
 54 See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess, 438 F.3d 
507; Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1026‒27 (8th Cir. 2002); Sliney v. Battley (In re Schmitz), 
270 F.3d 1254, 1255 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 55 A factual permutation in which the debtor’s application is filed prepetition and the authorizing 
legislation is passed postpetition is not possible because an application for a government payment program 
cannot be filed if a government payment program does not exist.  
 56 See In re Mattice, 81 B.R. 504, 507 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987). 
 57 See Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), 864 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1988); Mattice, 81 B.R. at 507. 
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In re Mattice is one of the earliest cases to interpret § 541(a)(1)’s temporal 
limitation in the context of government payment programs.58 In Mattice, the 
court held that a debtor does not have a right to a government program 
payment until the debtor’s application is approved.59 Here, the debtors’ 
application to participate in the 1986 Feed and Grain Program was approved 
on May 9, 1986.60 On December 23, 1986, the debtors filed a joint petition for 
bankruptcy.61 The debtors’ application for the 1987 Feed and Grain Program 
was filed prior to filing for bankruptcy, but approved after the filing on 
December 31, 1986.62 The Feed and Grain Program required the debtors to 
divert certain acreage from agricultural use in return for a cash payment.63 
USDA argued that the Feed and Grain Program payments were subject to 
the security agreement it had against the debtors’ property, and that § 552(b) 
applied.64 Section 552(b) creates an exception to § 552(a)’s rule that property 
acquired after filing a petition is not subject to any lien resulting from any 
security agreement entered into before the case.65 Specifically, § 552(b) states 
that a security agreement executed before bankruptcy can extend to proceeds 
acquired after the filing of bankruptcy if they are proceeds of property the 
debtor acquired before the commencement of the case.66 
The court held that this exception was not applicable to the 1987 program 
payments because the debtors had “no rights in the 1987 program payment 
until their application was approved, which occurred after the filing.”67 The 
1987 program payments were therefore not property of the estate under 
§ 541(a)(1).68 The 1986 program payments, however, were property of the 
estate under § 541(a)(1) because debtors obtained legal rights to the payment 
through approval of their application prior to filing for bankruptcy.69 This case 
stands for the proposition that a legal right to government payments is created 
when the program application is accepted, not when it is filed.70 
 
 58 See Mattice, 81 B.R. 504.  
 59 Id. at 507.  
 60 Id. at 506. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 505. 
 63 Id. at 506. 
 64 Id. at 507. 
 65 Id. at 506–07; see 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).  
 66 Mattice, 81 B.R. at 507. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
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A similar case, Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), found the government 
payment program at issue to effectively create a contractual obligation, with 
continuing duties to be exchanged between the debtor and creditor.71 Due to 
the continuing and mutual nature of the payment program, the court held the 
debtor could not have a legal right or interest in the government payment until 
each party had signed and approved the contract that authorizes payment.72 In 
Schneider, the payment at issue was administered by USDA’s Commodity 
Credit Corporation as part of a crop reduction and diversion program.73 On 
March 12, 1984 the debtor requested an eligibility determination from the 
Commodity Credit Corporation.74 On March 27, 1984 the debtor filed a 
petition for bankruptcy.75 On April 16, 1984 the Government determined the 
debtor was eligible for the crop reduction and diversion program.76 
The court held that the debtor did not have a legal right to the payments 
prepetition because the contract for the payments had not been formed as of the 
date of the petition.77 The eligibility agreement created an executory contract 
in which services were to be exchanged, because it required the debtor to limit 
the acres of wheat planted in return for payment.78 Although the amount of the 
entitlement was liquidated and determinable at the time of the bankruptcy 
petition under the USDA regulations, the contract required future services by 
the debtor before the payment could become due.79 The key point from this 
case is that payments received postpetition are not property of the estate under 
§ 541(a)(1) if the contract was formed postpetition.80 
Mattice and Schnedier each featured government payment programs that 
were contractual in nature, and required future performance by the debtor. 
These cases indicate that when a government payment program is contractual, 
a debtor does not obtain a legal or equitable interest in the government 
payment until the contract is formed, often through application approval. 
 
 71 Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), 864 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 72 Id. at 685‒86. 
 73 Id. at 684. 
 74 Id. at 684 n.1. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 685–86.The government did not approve the debtor’s participation in the program and sign the 
contract until April 16, 1984, three weeks after the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 684 n.1. 
 78 Id. at 685. 
 79 Id. at 686. 
 80 Id. 
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B. Prepetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date 
The second factual pattern highlights when a government payment 
becomes property of the estate between two different points in time: when the 
legislation is passed, or when the debtor files an application for payment.81 
Key to this analysis is whether the debtor has a legal or equitable interest in the 
government payment at the time of the bankruptcy petition, or just a mere hope 
or expectancy.82 
Segal v. Rochelle is the only case in which the Supreme Court has weighed 
in on when a government payment becomes property of the estate.83 The case 
was decided in 1966 and predates the Code. The Court, however, emphasized 
the purposes of the old Bankruptcy Act, explaining that the “bankruptcy 
estate” should be broadly interpreted.84 An interest should not be deemed 
outside its reach because it was novel or contingent at the time the debtor filed 
for bankruptcy.85 The Court articulated a “sufficiently rooted” test to determine 
if tax refunds tied to prepetition losses, but received postpetition, were property 
of the bankruptcy estate.86 The Court held that the tax refund claims were 
“sufficiently rooted” in the prebankruptcy past, not entangled with the debtor’s 
fresh start, and should be considered a part of the bankruptcy estate.87 The 
“sufficiently rooted” test from Segal does not find a particular date or event to 
determine when a debtor acquires a legal right to payment, but rather uses a 
purpose-based approach in which the facts as a whole must be analyzed.88 
The more modern, post-Code case, Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), held that 
although the debtor did not apply for disaster payment benefits until after filing 
for bankruptcy, the payments were property of the estate because they 
qualified as proceeds under § 541(a)(6).89 In Ring, the debtor experienced crop 
losses during the 1990 and 1991 crop years.90 The legislation authorizing the 
disaster payments at issue was signed into law on December 12, 1991.91 On 
 
 81 See Boyett v. Moore (In re Boyett), 250 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000); Drewes v. Lesmeister 
(In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 925 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1999). 
 82 See Boyett, 250 B.R. at 821. 
 83 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). 
 84 Id. at 379. 
 85 Id. at 380. 
 86 Id. at 376, 379. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), 169 B.R. 73, 77 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993). 
 90 See id. at 74. 
 91 Id. 
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January 10, 1992, the debtor filed his petition for bankruptcy, and did not list 
in his schedule of assets a claim for crop disaster payments.92 In February of 
1992, the debtor applied for the crop disaster benefits, and on April 15, 1992, 
the application was approved, and the debtor was paid $58,987.00.93 
The court interpreted precedent as framing the relevant issue to be whether 
the debtor’s postpetition entitlements under the disaster assistance program 
qualified as “proceeds” under § 541(a)(6).94 The court found the disaster 
payments “analogous to insurance payments for crop loss or damage.”95 The 
definition of proceeds under the relevant UCC provision at the time, UCC § 9-
306, expressly included “insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the 
collateral.”96 The determinative factor for the court was that the property lost, 
the crop, was prepetition property that the debtor had a legal right or interest in 
prior to the commencement of the case.97 Therefore, “proceeds” of the lost 
crop became part of the bankruptcy estate at the time the petition was filed.98 
The purpose of the disaster payment is to compensate the debtor for crop 
losses, much like a postpetition insurance payment.99 Like Segal, Ring did not 
find a certain date in time to dictate when a debtor obtains a legal or equitable 
interest in a government payment.100 Ring instead focused on the language of 
the Code and the UCC, applying the statutory provisions to the facts of the 
given case.101 
The issue raised in the next case, Drewes v. Lesmeister (In re Lesmeister), 
is whether a government payment is property of the estate when the legislation 
is passed prepetition, but the regulations are promulgated postpetition.102 In 
Lesmeister, the debtors argued that because the federal regulations establishing 
the procedures for payment under the Crop Loss Disaster Assistance Program 
(CLDAP) were promulgated postpetition, the disaster payments were not 
property of the estate under § 541(a).103 In Lesmeister, the Agricultural and 
Rural Redevelopment Act that authorized CLDAP funding was signed into law 
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 75. 
 95 Id. at 76. 
 96 Id. at 76 n.4 (citations omitted).  
 97 Id. at 77. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 511, 515 (1966); Ring, 169 B.R. at 75 n.3, 76 n.4.  
 101 Ring, 169 B.R. at 75 n.3, 76 n.4. 
 102 Drewes v. Lesmeister (In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 925 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1999). 
 103 Id. at 923. 
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after the debtors’ crop loss on October 21, 1998.104 On February 10, 1999, the 
debtor farmer filed a bankruptcy petition.105 On April 15, 1999, USDA 
promulgated and issued the final CLDAP regulations.106 
The court stated that to determine whether a legally cognizable property 
right exists within the meaning of § 541(a)(1), one must focus on whether all 
events establishing the debtor’s right to payment occurred prepetition.107 
Because it was undisputed that the debtors lost their crop prepetition, the issue 
became whether the debtors had a sufficient “legal interest” in the crop disaster 
payment at the time of the bankruptcy petition.108 Specifically, was a legal 
interest in the program payments created by the passage of the enabling act in 
October of 1998, or upon promulgation of the final regulations in April of 
1999?109 
The court held that a legal interest was created when the bill authorizing the 
crop payment program was signed into law.110 The statutory scheme dictated 
the substance of the payments, and the regulations only laid out the procedural 
mechanisms for applying and calculating the payment amount.111 All of the 
events necessary to establish the debtor’s right to payment occurred 
prepetition, with the last necessary condition being passage of the 
legislation.112 What the debtor had at the time of the bankruptcy petition was a 
contingent claim, closely analogous to an “action for damages not yet put into 
suit.”113 Furthermore, the court refused to subject the Code’s definition of 
§ 541 to the narrower parameters of the UCC.114 The court noted that although 
the UCC definition of proceeds is useful, it is by no means mandatory to 
use.115 Rather, to interpret § 541(a)(6) it is essential to accept the notion that 
“when a debtor acquires an interest in property . . . § 541(a)(1) includes any 
legal or equitable interest which is inherently a far more expansive concept 
than the [UCC] definition of proceeds.”116 
 
 104 Id. at 922–23. 
 105 Id. at 922. 
 106 Id. at 922–23. 
 107 Id. at 924–25. 
 108 See id. at 924. 
 109 Id. at 925 (referring to attachment which is a “prerequisite to enforcement of a security interest”).  
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 925–26. 
 112 Id. at 925. 
 113 Id. at 924–25. 
 114 Id. at 924. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
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Although Lesmeister is similar to Ring in that no date is determinative as to 
when a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment, Lesmeister 
found the payment program’s proceeds to be property of the estate by focusing 
on the relevant § 541 provisions rather than by making a comparison to 
insurance payments.117 What is interesting is the language of the Lesmeister 
test, which examines whether all acts and events giving rise to the debtors’ 
right to participate in the program occurred prepetition.118 
The most recent case under this factual bucket is Boyett v. Moore (In re 
Boyett).119 In Boyett, the court explicitly rejected the argument that a debtor 
does not have a legal or equitable interest in a crop disaster payment until his 
application is filed or approved.120 Here, the legislation authorizing the 
CLDAP program became law on October 21, 1998.121 On February 16, 1999 
the debtor petitioned for bankruptcy relief, prior to filing a CLDAP application 
on April 6, 1999.122 The regulations for CLDAP became effective on April 15, 
1999.123 
The debtor argued that although the CLDAP program was enacted prior to 
his bankruptcy filing, he did not have a legal interest in the payment at the time 
of filing because the regulations and sign-up period were not established until 
after the date of petition.124 The court championed the Lesmeister decision, 
reiterating that a debtor has a legal or equitable interest in a government 
payment when all events giving rise to the benefit occurred prepetition.125 The 
court therefore considered the payment to be property of the estate under 
§ 541(a)(1) because all events giving rise to the benefit, including the 
authorizing legislation and crop loss, occurred prepetition.126 
In addition, the court reaffirmed that disaster payments based on prepetition 
losses are additional compensation for crops grown prebankruptcy, and 
 
 117 Compare id. (the Code’s definition of “interest” is much more expansive than the UCC’s definition of 
“proceeds”), with Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), 169 B.R. 73, 77 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (arguing that under the UCC, 
disaster relief program payments are like insurance payments). 
 118 Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 926. 
 119  Boyett v. Moore (In re Boyett), 250 B.R. 817 (S.D. Ga. 2000).  
 120 See id. 
 121 Id. at 818. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 819. 
 125 See id. at 819–20 (citing Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos), 243 B.R. 96, 100‒01 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
1999), abrogated by In re Stallings, 290 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003)). 
 126 Boyett, 250 B.R. at 820. 
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therefore are proceeds of the estate pursuant to § 541(a)(6).127 The court also 
distinguished crop disaster payment programs from contractual, or payment-in-
kind subsidy programs, like the one at issue in Mattice.128 In this case, CLDAP 
payments are due to a farmer once all the conditions for payment are met.129 At 
the time of filing in this case, debtor’s entitlement to payment existed because 
the program had been enacted and the debtor had lost his crop, despite the fact 
that the debtor’s payment could not be immediately realized.130 Thus, the 
debtor’s postpetition application for payment was held to be “merely a 
ministerial act, not a qualifying event.”131 
The test emerging from the cases in this factual category appears to be 
whether “all acts and events giving rise to [the debtor’s] right to participate in 
the program arose [prepetition].”132 Similar to the first factual bucket, there is 
no specific moment in time when the debtor obtains a legal or equitable 
interest in a government payment.133 However, the court in Boyett contrasted 
payment in kind programs with subsidy or entitlement programs, and explicitly 
rejected the use of the postpetition program application date as a qualifying 
event determinative to § 541(a) analysis of entitlement programs.134 Although 
a clear date may not be settled, at least one option, a postpetition program 
application date, has been rejected. 
C. Postpetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date 
In the 2000s, the issue of whether a government payment authorized by 
postpetition legislation could be considered property of the estate was widely 
discussed and litigated. Early decisions took an expansive approach, holding 
that any postpetition crop disaster payment arising from a prepetition crop loss 
 
 127 Id. (citing Lemos, 243 B.R. at 100‒01). 
 128 Compare Boyett, 250 B.R. at 820 (debtor made no claims to a contract with the government), with In 
re Mattice, 81 B.R. 504, 506 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (farmers entered into agreements to not plant crops with the 
government in exchange for monetary compensation). Payment-in-kind programs are executory contracts 
because they involve an unperformed exchange of services, as the government pays the farmer in exchange for 
his promise not to plant crops. Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822 (citing Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider) 864 F.2d 
683, 685 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Schmaling, 783 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 129 Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Drewes v. Lesmeister (In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 926 (D.N.D. 1999); see Boyett, 250 B.R. 817 
(citing Lemos, 243 B.R. at 99). 
 133 See generally Lesmeister, 242 B.R. 920; Mattice, 81 B.R. 504. 
 134 Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822. 
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was a contingent property interest within the scope of § 541(a)(1) or (6).135 The 
Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos) decision is perhaps the best example of this 
approach.136 The court in Lemos held that crop disaster payments authorized by 
postpetition legislation, were “so rooted” in prepetition crop losses as to 
constitute property of the bankruptcy estate.137 The court reasoned the debtor 
was entitled to the payments only as a result of events that occurred 
prebankruptcy, with no substantial event occurring postbankruptcy that limited 
or changed his eligibility.138 At the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, the 
debtor had a contingent interest in the prospect of a federal program being 
adopted to compensate him for his crop losses.139 
Later decisions saw courts reconsider when a crop loss payment can be 
considered property of the bankruptcy estate. The expansive approach 
demonstrated by Lemos was curtailed by a new bright line rule that crop loss 
payments cannot be considered property of the bankruptcy estate unless the 
legislation authorizing the payment was enacted prepetition.140 The driving 
principle behind this theory is that a debtor cannot have a contingent interest in 
a government payment not yet authorized by Congress.141 
This bright line rule was first articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Drewes v. 
Vote (In re Vote).142 In Vote the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition on 
September 7, 1999.143 Subsequent to the filing, on October 22, 1999, Congress 
enacted the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000.144 The Act 
provided payments for all farmers enrolled in 7-year production contracts 
through USDA’s Market Loss Assistance Program (MLAP), and funded The 
Crop Disaster Program (CDP) for the 1999 crop year.145 On November 3, 
 
 135 See Lemos, 243 B.R. at 99. 
 136  See generally id. 
 137 Id. at 100 (quoting Battley v. Schmitz (In re Schmitz), 224 B.R. 117 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1998)). The 
“so rooted” test and its purpose driven approach is very similar to, and draws heavily upon, the Supreme 
Court’s “sufficiently rooted” test set forth in Segal. Id. (quoting Battley v. Schmitz, (In re Schmitz), 224 B.R. 
117, 124 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1998) (citing Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966))). 
 138 Lemos, 243 B.R. at 98‒99. 
 139 Id. at 99. 
 140 See Drewes v. Vote, (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439, 443‒44 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001). 
 141 See generally Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1236, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 495 (5th Cir. 2006); Vote, 261 B.R. at 443‒44. 
 142 See Vote, 261 B.R. at 443‒44. 
 143 Id. at 440. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
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1999, the debtor farmer received a MLAP payment, followed by two CDP 
payments: one on February 9, 2000, and another on April 7, 2000.146 
The court described the issue of whether a postpetition payment, enacted by 
postpetition legislation, but rooted in prepetition crop losses, should be 
considered property of the estate as an “extremely close call.”147 The court 
considered two alternatives. On one hand, it reasoned that the broad 
“sufficiently rooted” reasoning of Segal might support a finding that the CDP 
payments in this case were property of the estate.148 On the other hand, it 
reasoned that the holding in Segal is limited to tax refunds, and therefore, is 
inapplicable to government payment programs, like MLAP and CDP.149 The 
court concluded Segal was of limited applicability, and held that the debtor had 
only an expectation or hope that Congress would pass crop relief legislation at 
the time he filed for bankruptcy.150 Such an expectation did “not rise to the 
level of a ‘legal or equitable interest’ in property such that it might be 
considered property of the estate under § 541(a)(1).”151 
Following the decision in Vote, other circuit courts heard similar cases 
presenting the issue of whether crop disaster payments authorized by 
postpetition legislation were property of the estate.152 For example, Burgess v. 
Sikes (In re Burgess), a case that strongly endorsed Vote, held that a debtor did 
not obtain a legal interest in a government payment until the postpetition 
legislation authorizing the payment was passed.153 The debtor in Burgess filed 
a petition for bankruptcy in August of 2002.154 In February of 2003, Congress 
passed the Agricultural Assistance Act.155 The legislation “provided for crop 
disaster-relief-payments to qualifying farmers for 2001 or 2002 crop losses.”156 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 443. 
 148 Id. at 442–44 (quoting Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379‒81 (1966)). 
 149 Id. at 443–44. The court revisited the Code’s legislative history to determine if Segal’s definition of 
property was dispositive. Surprisingly, the court discovered an alternate interpretation previously overlooked 
within the congressional record: “The result in Segal v. Rochelle . . . is followed, and the right to a refund is 
property of the estate.” Because of Segal’s “questionable applicability”, and the existence of a concrete date as 
to when the debtor became legally entitled to the disaster relief payments, the court did not include the 
payments within the property of the estate. Id. 
 150 Id. at 444. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See generally Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes 
(In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Andrews, 386 B.R. 871 (Bankr. D. Utah 2008). 
 153 Burgess, 438 F.3d at 494, 499.  
 154 Id. at 495. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
BOXOLD GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:12 PM 
2014] GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS 447 
The debtor applied for a relief payment in August of 2003, and shortly 
thereafter USDA issued a check to the bankruptcy trustee for $24,829.157 The 
debtor filed a Motion for Turnover arguing the check was not property of the 
bankruptcy estate.158 
A split court held that crop disaster payments authorized by postpetition 
legislation are not property of the estate under either § 541(a)(1) or (6).159 The 
court added that it could “find no case in which a pure loss with no attendant 
potential benefit was included as property of the estate.”160 Furthermore, the 
court concluded that “for the temporal limitation to have any meaning at all, 
[the debtor] must have a prepetition interest in the disaster-relief payment 
[itself],” as one cannot have a legal interest in a crop loss.161 Therefore, to have 
a legal interest in a government payment, the authorizing legislation must have 
been passed prepetition.162 Like the court in Vote, the court in Burgess found 
that Segal did not survive enactment of the Code.163 
Burgess featured a strong dissent, with seven out of the sixteen judges 
dissenting.164 The dissent found § 541(a)(1) to describe property of the estate 
“in the broadest possible terms,” and § 541(a)(6) to reach “all conceivable 
[postpetition] returns yielded by the debtor’s property.”165 The dissent also 
looked to Supreme Court precedent for support, finding that the Court 
routinely concluded that property of the estate must be broadly interpreted.166 
The dissent added that Segal affirms the idea that a loss prior to bankruptcy 
can later yield property to be included in the bankruptcy estate.167 The fact that 
Segal was mentioned in the legislative history of the Code supports the 
proposition that it should be followed, and not disavowed.168 Burgess 
highlights two approaches to § 541 analysis in the context of government 
 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 495, 508. 
 160 Id. at 503. 
 161 Id.  
 162 See id. 
 163 Id. at 498–99. 
 164 Id. at 508 (Jones, C.J., dissenting). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983)). 
 167 Id. at 511 (citing Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966)).  
 168 See id. at 508 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6323).  
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payments: an expansive analysis, and a bright line approach in which a 
program authorized by postpetition legislation is a mere expectation.169 
A few months after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Burgess, the Eleventh 
Circuit heard a similar case in Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell).170 
Bracewell also held that crop disaster payments authorized by postpetition 
legislation, but based on prepetition losses, are not property of the estate.171 
The court reasoned that when legislation is passed postpetition the debtor has 
“only a hope” that the legislation would be passed, and therefore has no right 
or interest that constitutes property.172 
The debtor in Bracewell lost a substantial amount of his 2001 crop due to a 
drought.173 Unable to repay his debts, the debtor filed for bankruptcy on May 
29, 2002.174 The Emergency Farmer and Rancher Assistance Act, signed into 
law on February 20, 2003, provided for monetary assistance to farmers who 
suffered losses to their 2001 or 2002 crops due to weather-related disasters or 
emergency conditions.175 Shortly thereafter the debtor applied for payment and 
received $41,566 while his bankruptcy case was still pending.176 
The trustee argued that the payment was property of the estate pursuant to 
§ 541(a)(6), claiming that it was proceeds of the estate, analogous to insurance 
payments.177 The court reasoned that “there is a difference between insurance 
payments stemming from the destruction of property” and “disaster assistance 
authorized after the estate was created.”178 The destroyed crops did not fit 
within the meaning of the term proceeds because they could not create 
anything of value which could be exchanged or sold.179 Given this reasoning, 
the court held that if the disaster legislation is not law at the time of filing, the 
debtor cannot have a legal or equitable interest in the payment.180 The court 
also found the two previous circuit court decisions in Vote and Burgess to be 
persuasive support for the proposition that no legal or equitable interest can 
 
 169 See id. 
 170 See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 171 See id. 
 172 Id. at 1239.  
 173 Id. at 1236.  
 174 Id. at 1247.  
 175 Id. at 1236.  
 176 Id. at 1237.  
 177 Id. at 1246.  
 178 Id.  
 179 Id. at 1247.  
 180 Id. at 1246.  
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exist until the authorizing legislation is signed into law.181 Thus, § 541(a)(1)’s 
temporal limitation controls the analysis, rather than Segal’s “sufficiently 
rooted” pre-Code test.182 
The one dissenting judge in Bracewell closely followed the dissent in 
Burgess.183 The dissent emphasized Segal’s “sufficiently rooted” test, and 
believed that the decision survived the passage of the Code.184 The dissent also 
noted that both the current and previous versions of the Code featured an 
expansive definition of property of the estate, lending credence to the notion 
that Segal and a broad interpretation of property of the estate survives in 
§ 541.185 
The Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell opinions have drawn a line, holding that 
a debtor cannot have a legal or equitable interest in a government payment if 
the authorizing legislation was not signed into law prior to the bankruptcy 
filing.186 These decisions reasoned that a debtor has no way of knowing 
whether Congress would in fact confer payment, and could only hope that 
relief legislation would be passed.187 
The general issue left unanswered by cases analyzing § 541 is at what 
precise point does a government payment become a legal entitlement or 
property interest. The opinions seem to suggest three general possibilities: (1) 
at the passage of the legislation; (2) at the approval of the application or at the 
formation of a contract; or (3) when the debtor satisfies all the requirements for 
payment.188 The one bright-line rule that has emerged is that crop disaster 
payments authorized by postpetition legislation are under no circumstances 
considered property of the bankruptcy estate. 
 
 181 See id. at 1238 (citing Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2006); Drewes v. 
Vote, (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439, 443 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001)).  
 182 See id. (citing Burgess, 438 F.3d at 498; Vote, 261 B.R. at 443). 
 183 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249‒50 (Pryor, J., dissenting); Burgess, 438 F.3d at 508–11 (Jones, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 184 Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249‒50 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
 185 Id. at 1050–51. 
 186 See generally id. (citing Burgess, 438 F.3d at 498; Vote, 261 B.R. 439). 
 187 Susan A. Schneider, Who Gets the Check: Determining When Federal Farm Programs Are Property of 
the Estate, 84 NEB. L. REV. 469, 503 (2005). 
 188 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1238 (citing Burgess, 438 F.3d at 498; Vote, 261 B.R. at 443).  
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III.  RIGHT TO SETOFF UNDER § 553 
The right of a creditor to setoff mutual debts is set forth in § 553.189 Section 
553 does not purport to create a right to setoff but rather “preserves” a pre-
existing right to setoff.190 The USDA’s right to setoff in bankruptcy is 
authorized by 7 C.F.R. § 631.20.191  
In order for a creditor’s prepetition right of setoff to survive in 
bankruptcy under § 553(a), three requirements must be satisfied: (1) 
the parties must owe each other mutual debts, (2) the mutual debts 
must have arisen [prepetition], and (3) the creditor’s claim cannot fall 
within one of the three statutory exceptions listed in § 553(a)(1)–
(3).192 
The main issue presented in the context of government payment programs 
is whether the mutual debts arose prepetition.193 This occurs because a debtor 
may experience a prepetition loss, but will not file an application for payment 
until after a bankruptcy petition is filed, raising the issue of when the debt 
actually arose.194 There appears to be a clearer standard under § 553 than under 
§ 541. The right to setoff in § 553 articulates that the payment must be 
“owing” at the time of the petition for a creditor to possess the right to setoff. 
Again, discussion of the case law will fall into the factual buckets discussed 
previously. 
A. Prepetition Legislation and Prepetition Application Date 
The two cases discussed in this factual bucket use similar “absolutely 
owing” and “all transactions necessary” tests to determine when a debtor 
obtains a legal or equitable interest in a government payment in the context of 
setoff, indicating a clearer standard.195 The first case is Moratzka v. 
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (In re Matthieson).196 In 
Matthieson, six debtors were enrolled in the Federal Crop Deficiency Program 
 
 189 See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 190 See id. 
 191 7 C.F.R. § 631.20 (2013).  
 192 United Serv. Prot. Corp. v. Bill Heard Enters., (In re Bill Heard Enters.), 438 B.R. 745, 750 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 2010) (citations omitted). 
 193 See generally In re Young, 144 B.R. 45, 45‒47 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (discussing the issue of 
whether the mutual debt arose prepetition).  
 194 See generally Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012). 
 195 Moratzka v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv. (In re Matthieson), 63 B.R. 56, 58–59 (D. 
Minn. 1986); United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1434–35 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 196 See Matthieson, 63 B.R. 56. 
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for the 1984 growing season.197 After enrolling in the program, but before 
receiving the payments, the debtors filed for bankruptcy.198 Each of the debtors 
also owed the government prepetition debts.199 
The sole issue was whether the deficiency payments owed by USDA to the 
enrolled debtors were prepetition obligations and therefore subject to setoff 
against the claim USDA had against each of the debtors.200 The court reasoned 
that a government payment may be a prepetition debt for purposes of mutuality 
notwithstanding the fact that the payment is immature.201 In other words, a 
creditor’s right of setoff may be asserted in a bankruptcy case even though at 
the time the petition is filed the debt is “absolutely owing” but is not yet 
presently due.202 Furthermore, when an obligation exists prior to bankruptcy, it 
is irrelevant that it is unliquidated until after the petition is filed.203 
The court engaged in a factual analysis and found that the debtors satisfied 
all the conditions for payment prior to filing for bankruptcy.204 The deficiency 
program agreement did not contain any conditions precedent that remained 
unsatisfied as of the petition date.205 Although the program did require certain 
contractual duties to be performed by the debtor, these were contractual 
promises rather than conditions precedent.206 
In the second case, United States v. Gerth, the Eighth Circuit considered 
the USDA’s motion to modify the automatic stay to permit setoff.207 In Gerth, 
the USDA owed the debtor certain conservation reserve payments, and wished 
to setoff these payments against a debt the debtor had previously incurred with 
the USDA.208 The debtor however argued that the conservation reserve 
payment did not arise prepetition because the program’s funds were annually 
 
 197 Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 56. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 59. 
 202 Id. at 58. (citing Traders Bank of Kan. City v. Stonitsch (In re Isis Foods, Inc.), 24 B.R. 75, 76 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1982). A debt is regarded as “absolutely owing” when there can be no question about the existence 
of the debt. Isis Foods, 24 B.R. at 76. 
 203 Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 59 (citing Mich. Consol. Gas Co. v. Fred Sanders Co. (In re Fred Sanders Co.), 
33 Bankr. 310, 312 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983)).  
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 60. 
 206 Id. at 59. 
 207 United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1429 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 208 Id. at 1429–30. 
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appropriated, and at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed the relevant 
crop year’s funds had not been appropriated to the USDA.209 
The Eighth Circuit held that “dependency on a [postpetition] event does not 
prevent a debt from arising [prepetition].”210 The court added that a claim is 
not deemed to be postpetition merely because it is contingent, unliquidated or 
unmatured on the date of the bankruptcy petition.211 “A debt can be absolutely 
owing [prepetition] even though that debt would never have come into 
existence [but] for [postpetition] events.”212 A key factor for determining when 
a government debt is owed prepetition is whether “all transactions necessary” 
for the USDA’s liability took place prior to the farmer debtor’s filing of the 
bankruptcy petition.213 Here, the court found that all transactions necessary 
took place upon the debtor’s entry into the program because both parties 
signed the conservation program contract prepetition.214 The postpetition 
appropriation of funds by the USDA did not affect the farmer’s eligibility.215 
The two cases discussed use similar “absolutely owing” and “all 
transactions necessary” tests to determine when a debtor obtains a legal or 
equitable interest in a government payment in the context of a setoff.216 The 
cases also demonstrate that continuing contractual obligations and federal 
appropriation of funds do not affect a debtor’s eligibility and therefore do not 
sway analysis under § 553.217 
B. Prepetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date 
The one case in this factual bucket, In re Gibson, similarly articulates a 
clear “absolutely owing” rule.218 In Gibson, the USDA argued it was entitled to 
offset loan deficiency payments worth $18,000, which were applied for and 
received by the debtors postpetition.219 The debtors opposed the government’s 
motion to lift the automatic stay, contending that their right to the loan 
 
 209 Id. at 1432. 
 210 Id. at 1433. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. at 1434. 
 213 See id. at 1435. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 1434–35. 
 216 Id.; Moratzka v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv. (In re Matthieson), 63 B.R. 56, 58–59 (D. 
Minn. 1986). 
 217 See Gerth, 991 F.2d at 1434‒35; Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 59. 
 218 See In re Gibson, 308 B.R. 763, 765 (N.D. Tex. 2002). 
 219 Id. 
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deficiency payments was a postpetition right, thereby foreclosing setoff under 
§ 553.220 
The court stated that for a debt to arise prepetition, such debt must have 
been “absolutely owing” prepetition.221 This does not mean the debt must have 
been due prepetition, or that the creditor must have initiated collection of the 
debt prepetition.222 The court added that “it does not matter that [the] debt was 
contingent, unliquidated, or unmatured as of the date of the filing,” but “what 
matters is whether the liability accrued [prepetition].”223 The court then looked 
carefully at the eligibility requirements for the disaster payment, engaging in a 
factual inquiry.224 Ultimately, the court held that the debtors met all the 
program requirements prepetition, and that the debtors’ right to a payment 
accrued prepetition.225 The debtors only had to make the decision whether to 
exercise the right postpetition.226 The act of applying for a payment does not, 
by itself, make the government’s liability for the payment a postpetition 
debt.227 Rather, the right to payment is deemed to accrue prepetition if the 
debtors satisfy all requirements for obtaining payment under a government 
program prepetition.228 Therefore, setoff could be validly exercised by the 
USDA under 7 C.F.R. § 1412.406.229 
Other courts have not disagreed with the rule articulated in Gibson.230 It 
therefore appears to put forth a bright line rule as to when a crop disaster 
payment “arose” for the purposes of setoff under § 553 of the Code: it is 
immaterial whether a debtor files a postpetition application as long as the 
payment was “absolutely owing” as of the petition date.231 
Gibson furthermore suggests that this rule is not limited to the crop disaster 
payment context, and may extend to government payments generally.232 Gerth 
 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 768–69 (citing Braniff Airways Inc. v. Exxon Co., 814 F.2d 1030, 1035 (5th Cir.1987)).  
 222 Id. at 766. 
 223 Id. at 767. 
 224 Id. at 768–69. 
 225 Id. at 768–70. 
 226 Id. at 769. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 766. 
 230 See generally In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2012); In re U.S. 
Aeroteam, Inc., 327 B.R. 852 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005). 
 231 See Gibson, 308 B.R. at 763. 
 232 Id. at 767–69. 
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and Matthieson seem to support this test by adopting an approach that requires 
“all transactions necessary” to occur prior to the debtor’s filing for 
bankruptcy.233 The test for determining whether the government has a right to 
setoff with respect to government payments is therefore clearer under § 553 
than under § 541 property of the estate analysis. 
IV.  RECENT CASE LAW (2008–PRESENT) 
As discussed earlier, circuit court cases in the 2000s set a bright line rule 
that payments authorized by postpetition legislation are not property of the 
estate under § 541.234 These decisions, however, did not explicitly state at what 
point a debtor obtains a legal or equitable interest in a government payment.235 
In terms of the right to setoff under § 553, there appears to be a clearer rule: 
that the payment must be “absolutely owing” at the time of the bankruptcy 
petition.236  
Since 2008, however, few cases related to these issues have been decided. 
A contributing reason may be an increase in settlements.237 The few cases on 
point, which deal with SURE payments, reveal the lack of a clear standard as 
to when government payments become property of the bankruptcy estate.238 
Furthermore, debtors may be successfully arguing that a legal interest in a 
government payment does not arise until the program application date or the 
statutory authorization date.239  
This reasoning is inconsistent with the Code because these events are not 
determinative of when a debtor has a legal interest in a government 
payment.240 Instead a more searching factual inquiry is necessary. Recent cases 
deal with only two of the factual buckets: prepetition legislation followed by a 
 
 233 See United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1435 (8th Cir. 1993); Moratzka v. Agric. Stabilization & 
Conservation Serv. (In re Matthieson), 63 B.R. 56, 58‒59 (D. Minn. 1986). 
 234 See supra text accompanying notes 138–48, 150–60, 167–79. See generally In re Gibson, 308 B.R. 
763 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
 235 See generally Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes 
(In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2006); Drewes v. Vote, (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2001). 
 236 See generally Gibson, 308 B.R. 763. 
 237 See, e.g., Consent Order to Lift Stay and Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 
30, 2012). 
 238 See id.; In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012); In re 
VanderHouwen, No. 03-01244, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2010). 
 239 See, e.g., Farmer, 2012 WL 4905480, at *2; VanderHouwen, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156. 
 240 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). 
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postpetition application, and when both the legislation and the filing of the 
application occur postpetition. 
A. Prepetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date 
The two SURE cases in this factual bucket each deal with § 553 and the 
right of setoff. The first case was decided easily, and a setoff was granted.241 In 
the second case, the parties reached a settlement on one issue.242 On the second 
issue, the court found the statutory authorization date to be determinative of 
when a government payment is “absolutely owed,” yet interestingly still 
engaged in a factual inquiry.243 
In the first case, In re Smith, the debtor owed the USDA $66,142.244 On 
November 19, 2011, the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and shortly thereafter 
filed an application for a SURE payment due to the destruction of his 2010 
crop.245 On April 3, 2012, the USDA filed a Motion for Offset. The 
government’s Motion to Lift the Stay asserted that although the application for 
the SURE payment was not filed until after the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the 
debt arose prior to bankruptcy and the USDA possessed the right to offset.246 
On June 4, 2012, the Court granted the USDA’s motion to lift the automatic 
stay, which allowed the offset of the SURE payment.247 
The second case, In re Farmer, is similar to Smith because the authorizing 
legislation was signed prepetition, but the debtor filed a SURE application 
postpetition.248 In Farmer the debtor filed for chapter 12 on November 11, 
2010.249 On November 30, 2010, the USDA designated forty-two North 
Carolina counties as a Primary Natural Disaster Areas, including the county 
where the debtor resides.250 In 2011, the debtor filed a SURE application due 
to the destruction of his 2010 crop, and received a payment of $53,316.251 On 
 
 241 Order for Offset, In re Smith, No. 11-08865 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 4, 2012). 
 242 Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 2012). 
 243 In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012). 
 244 Motion for Offset at 1, In re Smith, No. 11-08865 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2012). 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at 2. 
 247 Order for Offset, In re Smith, No. 11-08865 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 4, 2012). 
 248 See Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 1–2, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 
2012). 
 249 See id. at 1. 
 250 News Release, supra note 8; see Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 2, Farmer, No. 10-09353. 
 251 Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 2, Farmer, No. 10-09353. 
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February 29, 2012, the USDA filed a motion for offset.252 The debtor objected, 
stating the USDA “sought to offset a [postpetition] claim of the [d]ebtor 
against [the USDA’s prepetition] claim.”253 Rather than go to trial, the parties 
agreed to settle.254 Under the settlement, $30,000 was offset by the USDA and 
the debtor received $23,316.00.255 
After settling the SURE payment, the parties then turned to the status of 
certain Direct and Countercyclical Program (DCP) payments.256 On May 31, 
2012, the debtor applied to participate in the DCP for the 2012 crop year.257 
USDA determined the debtor was entitled to $7,255, and filed a motion to lift 
the automatic stay in order to offset.258 The court held a hearing on the issue of 
whether the 2012 DCP payments arose prepetition or postpetition.259 The 
USDA asserted that the DCP program began in 2002 and was continued in 
2008 through passage of the Farm Bill, which provided funding through the 
2012 crop year.260 
The court held that the debtor “became eligible for DCP funds in 2008 with 
the passage of the 2008 Farm Bill.”261 The court reasoned that at that point the 
USDA became obligated to pay farmers eligible for DCP through 2012.262 
Therefore, the statutory authorization date was determinative of when the 
payment became absolutely owed.263 Interestingly, the debtor’s land was a mix 
of owned and leased property.264 The court concluded the payments as to the 
owned land arose prepetition, but those as to the leased land arose 
postpetition.265 When the debtor filed for bankruptcy in 2010, it was not certain 
that he would have control over this land in 2012.266 A condition necessary for 
payment, the debtor’s control, occurred postpetition.267 
 
 252 Id. at 1. 
 253 Objection to Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 1, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
Mar. 12, 2012). 
 254 Consent Order to Lift Stay and Offset, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2012). 
 255 Id. at 2. 
 256 See In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. at *2. 
 262 Id. 
 263 See id. at *1–2. 
 264 Id. at *2. 
 265 Id. at *1. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. at *2. 
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These cases further the idea that a clearer standard guides analysis under 
§ 553 than § 541, which necessitates a factual inquiry. However, even in the 
§ 553 context, courts are beginning to regard the statutory authorization date as 
determinative to “absolutely owing” analysis, post- Vote, Burgess, and 
Bracewell. In Farmer, the parties reached a settlement as to the SURE 
payment. Although the precise reason is uncertain, a searching factual inquiry 
reveals agency discretion over a condition necessary for payment, a novel issue 
unaddressed by bankruptcy courts. 
B. Postpetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date 
The two cases in this factual bucket each present the issue of whether a 
government assistance payment is property of the estate under § 541, post- 
Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell. The first case, In re Andrews, did not deal with a 
crop disaster payment program but with an economic stimulus payment.268 In 
Andrews, the debtor filed for bankruptcy on June 28, 2007.269 On February 13, 
2008, the Economic Stimulus Act was signed into law, and the debtor 
immediately became eligible for a payment of $1,200.270 To determine whether 
the stimulus payment was property of the estate, the court began its analysis by 
noting that the scope of § 541(a)(1) is broad and includes novel or contingent 
property interests.271 However, the court cautioned that a broad judicial 
construction of § 541(a)(1) must also be constrained by the plain language of 
the statute, and only reach legal interests that existed as of the commencement 
of the case.272 
The court acknowledged that similar to Vote’s crop disaster payments, the 
economic stimulus payment was not property of the estate because the federal 
legislation authorizing the payment was not enacted prior to the bankruptcy 
filing.273 The court reasoned that if a debtor has no means of knowing he 
qualifies for a government payment, no legal right can conceptually or actually 
exist.274 The court explained that “the inquiry is best determined by treating the 
 
 268 In re Andrews, 386 B.R. 871, 872 (Bankr. D. Utah 2008); Schneider, supra note 187. 
 269 Andrews, 386 B.R. at 872. 
 270 Id. at 872–73. 
 271 Id. at 873 (citing In re Montgomery, 224 F.3d 1193, 1194 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Barowsky v. 
Serelson, 946 F.2d 1516, 1518‒19 (10th Cir. 1991))).  
 272 Id. (quoting Drewes v. Vote (In re Vote), 261 B.R. 439, 442 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001)). 
 273 Id. at 874. 
 274 Id. 
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date of petition as the deciding factor and applying the analysis of In re 
Vote.”275 
Another case worth noting is In re VanderHouwen, in which the legislation 
and the application were both passed postpetition.276 The court found that 
“[c]ircuit cases on the issue agree that the date of enactment of the crop 
disaster program is determinative as to whether the [government payment] is 
property of the bankruptcy estate.”277 Following this rule, the court held that 
the postpetition payment was not property of the estate.278 This reasoning 
strongly suggests that the date of legislation is determinative and therefore 
provides a bright line rule when engaging in § 541 analysis.279 
These cases suggest that courts are beginning to regard the statutory 
authorization date as determinative in § 541 analysis. This result is inconsistent 
with the language of § 541, and indicates the need for a clear rule to determine 
when a government payment becomes property of the estate.280 
V. ENFORCEABLE STANDARDS UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In administrative law, the question of when a government payment 
becomes a “property interest” is relevant in the context of Fifth Amendment 
due process issues.281 The due process right provided in the Fifth Amendment 
protects individuals only from deprivations of life, liberty, and property.282 
Once an individual has a recognized property interest under the Fifth 
Amendment, that individual cannot be deprived of this interest without due 
process of law prior to the deprivation.283 In the 1970s, the Supreme Court 
formulated a clear rule as to when a government payment becomes a property 
interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.284 This rule could be applied in 
 
 275 Id. 
 276 See In re VanderHouwen, No. 03-01244, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156, at *8–9 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Jan. 
15, 2010). 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at *9. 
 279 Id. 
 280 See In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2012); VanderHouwen, 
2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156. 
 281 See generally Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593 (1972). 
 282 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 283 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570–71 (stating that the court must determine whether the benefit at stake is a 
property or liberty interest before due process of law is required); Perry, 408 U.S. at 599 (stating that there is 
no due process requirement unless a property or liberty interest is implicated). 
 284 See generally Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Perry, 408 U.S. 593. 
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the bankruptcy context to provide clear guidance on when a debtor obtains a 
legal or equitable interest in a government payment when agency discretion is 
an issue. 
The first case the Supreme Court decided was Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth. The plaintiff in Roth was an untenured professor at a public 
university who was informed, without explanation, that his contract would not 
be renewed the following year.285 The professor sued, claiming that the failure 
to provide him with notice and a hearing constituted a violation of his due 
process rights.286 The Supreme Court found that Roth’s due process rights 
were not violated because he did not have a property interest in his contract for 
employment.287 The Court reasoned that “[t]o have a property interest in a 
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for 
it . . . [and] more than a unilateral expectation of it.”288 Rather, a person needs 
“a legitimate claim of entitlement to [that benefit].”289 In this case, the express 
terms of the plaintiff’s annual contract created no possible claim of entitlement 
to re-employment.290 
Perry v. Sindermann, which was decided on the same day as Roth, also 
involved a claim by an untenured public university professor who lost his job 
following a short-term contract.291 In contrast to Roth, the court in Perry found 
that the professor did have a property interest in his employment.292 Unlike the 
employer in Roth, the employer in Perry had produced guidelines, handbooks 
and other official publications that may have created a “de-facto” tenure 
system.293 One faculty guideline provided that “[t]he Administration of the 
College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long 
as his teaching services are satisfactory.”294 Because of the plaintiff’s reliance 
on this language, he may have had a due process right that demanded his 
continued employment.295 Therefore, refusing to renew the professor’s contract 
 
 285 Roth, 408 U.S. at 566, 569. 
 286 Id. at 566. 
 287 Id. at 568. 
 288 Id. at 577. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. at 575. 
 291 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 594 (1972). 
 292 Id. at 602–03. 
 293 Id. at 599–602. 
 294 Id. at 600. 
 295 See id. at 600–01. 
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with no explanation may have constituted a violation of his due process 
rights.296 
The reason the Supreme Court found that a property right may exist in 
Perry, but not in Roth, was the existence of guidelines or standards.297 Without 
such guidelines, the government entity was not bound to act in a certain 
way.298 However, if guidelines were articulated, a “de facto” system may be 
found, creating an expectation and property right.299 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
Recent holdings run contrary to both the Code and relevant case law 
because these cases state or imply that the statutory authorization date is 
determinative of when a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government 
payment.300 This is not the correct approach because the statutory authorization 
date is not necessarily the same as the date a debtor acquires a legal interest in 
a government payment as required by § 541(a)(1). Although the Vote, Burgess, 
and Bracewell decisions state that government payments authorized by 
postpetition legislation are not property of the estate, they do not go so far as to 
say that this is determinative in § 541 analysis. In the context of setoff, § 553 
requires each debt to have arisen prepetition. Case law has formulated a clearer 
rule to determine when a government payment arose, articulated as when the 
payment is “absolutely owed.” Despite this clear rule recent cases also indicate 
confusion as to the effect of Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell in the § 553 context, 
and the importance attached the statutory authorization date. 
This Comment proposes that the standard under both provisions should be 
when a government payment is “absolutely owed.”301 A payment becomes 
“absolutely owing” when all of the conditions required for payment are 
satisfied, emphasizing the factual inquiry required under both §§ 541 and 
553.302 When a condition necessary for payment is dependent upon an act 
 
 296 Id. at 599. 
 297 Compare Board of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), with Perry, 408 U.S. 593. 
 298 See generally Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Perry, 408 U.S. 593. 
 299 See generally Roth, 408 U.S. 564; Perry, 408 U.S. 593. 
 300 Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 553 (2012), with In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct, 15, 2012); In re VanderHouwen, No. 03-01244, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 156 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wash. Jan. 15, 2010). 
 301 See Traders Bank of Kan. City v. Stonitsch (In re Isis Foods, Inc.), 24 B.R. 75, 76 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 
1982). 
 302 See In re Gibson, 308 B.R. 763, 767‒68 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
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within an agency’s discretion, analysis should be guided by administrative law. 
Analysis in this situation would turn on whether the agency has created 
guidelines or standards that create the kind of legitimate expectations discussed 
in Regency and Roth.303 When such guidelines exist, agency discretion is 
limited accordingly.304 Adopting this clear standard will limit arguments that a 
debtor obtains a legal right to a government payment at an alternative point in 
time, and clear up the law post- Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell. 
Reproduced below is a table of the discussed case law, and which factual 




























The cases in italics are the recent cases. The cases in bold are those that 
discuss the right to setoff under § 553. The cases in plain text are those that 
deal with § 541 property of the estate analysis. The table is useful because it 
highlights the factual differences that have in part led to inconsistent holdings 
as to when a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment. 
A. Prepetition Legislation and Prepetition Application Date 
In the context of prepetition legislation and a prepetition application date, 
debtors often argue that they do not have a legal interest in a government 
payment until the application approval date, or some other point in time 
 
 303 See supra text accompanying notes 282296. 
 304 See Perry, 408 U.S. at 598–99. 
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postpetition.305 In cases dealing with property of the estate analysis under 
§ 541, such as Mattice and Schneider, courts have held that a debtor does not 
hold an interest in a government payment until the application is approved.306 
However, the government payments at issue in Mattice and Schneider were 
contractual in nature.307 Until each party approves the contract, a legal right or 
interest in a government payment could not exist; and in the case of a 
declaration, a regulation mandated approval of the contract by each party.308 
In contrast, Gerth and Matthieson, which fall in the same factual bucket, 
deal with the right to setoff under § 553.309 In Matthieson, factually similar to 
Mattice and Schneider, the debtor argued he did not have a legal interest in the 
government payment until the application was approved.310 In Matthieson, 
however, this argument failed because the government payment program at 
issue was an assistance program, and mutual duties were not required to be 
exchanged.311 Therefore, agreement or application approval was not a 
condition precedent to eligibility for payment.312 In Matthieson, the debtor met 
all of the conditions for payment prior to the application date, making the 
payment “absolutely owing.”313 In Gerth, however, the program was 
contractual in nature.314 The court rejected the debtor’s argument that he did 
not obtain a legal right to the payment until funds were distributed, and held 
that the debtor’s performance was not a “transaction necessary” to the farmer 
being entitled to payment, since the parties had already exchanged mutual 
promises, including the government’s promise to pay.315 
Case law shows that the distinction between contractual programs and 
assistance programs is an important threshold consideration. In the government 
payment context, an initial determination should be made as to whether the 
program is contractual in nature or purely a form of subsidy or assistance. An 
assistance program does not require as a condition precedent a mutual 
agreement because the payment is “absolutely owing” once the eligible debtor 
 
 305 See, e.g., Moratzka v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv. (In re Matthieson) 63 B.R. 56, 58 (D. 
Minn. 1986); In re Mattice, 81 B.R. 504, 506 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987). 
 306 See Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), 864 F.2d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1988); Mattice, 81 B.R. at 506. 
 307 See Schneider, 864 F.2d at 685; Mattice, 81 B.R. at 506. 
 308 See Schneider, 864 F.2d at 685‒86. 
 309 See United States v. Gerth, 991 F.2d 1428, 1429 (8th Cir. 1993); Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 58. 
 310 See Matthieson, 63 B.R. at 58. 
 311 Id. at 58–60. 
 312 Id. at 60. 
 313 See id. 
 314 See Gerth, 991 F.2d 1433.  
 315 See id. 1434‒35.  
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satisfies all of the program requirements. The proposed rule is applicable in 
both of these contexts because, in a contractual program, an event necessary 
for a payment to become “absolutely owed” is mutual ratification. In an 
assistance program, the debtor needs to meet certain requirements, but no 
agency approval or actions serve as a condition precedent for eligibility. 
B. Prepetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date 
The second factual bucket deals with cases where the legislation is passed 
prepetition but the debtor does not file an application until after the petition 
date. The rule that emerges from cases discussing property of the estate under 
§ 541 in this factual category, is that a debtor obtains a legal interest in a 
government payment when all events giving rise to the benefit occur 
prepetition.316 Although the reasoning behind the rule can be different, from 
Ring’s reliance on the definition of proceeds in the UCC, to Boyett’s focus on 
the language of § 541(a)(1) and (6), the overall purpose appears to be the 
same.317 For example, in Lesmeister, the court found that the debtor had a legal 
interest in the government payment at issue at the time of the bankruptcy 
petition because all transactions necessary to payment had already occurred.318 
The debtor’s argument that he had no such interest failed because the 
regulation’s promulgation was not a transaction necessary for the debtor to 
become entitled to payment.319 
Similar to the previous factual bucket, these cases do not set a specific 
moment in time when the debtor obtains a legal or equitable interest in a 
government payment. However, the court in Boyett explicitly rejects the 
program application date as a qualifying event determinative to § 541(a) 
analysis in the context of assistance programs.320 The applicability of Segal 
and its “so rooted” test is barely addressed,321 but it appears that the cases in 
this factual bucket would almost always satisfy such an approach. If the 
legislation was passed prepetition and the crop was lost prepetition, the events 
 
 316 See Boyett v. Moore (In re Boyett), 250 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2000); Drewes v. Lesmeister 
(In re Lesmeister), 242 B.R. 920, 926 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1999). 
 317 See Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822; cf. Kelley v. Ring (In re Ring), 169 B.R. 73, 77 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993) 
(holding that crop disaster payments were proceeds from prepetition crops). “Proceeds” is not defined by the 
Code, leading some courts to use the UCC definition to help guide analysis. See id. The UCC, however, is not 
dispositive in interpreting the statutory language of the Code. Id. 
 318 Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 926. 
 319 Id. at 925–26. 
 320 Boyett, 250 B.R. at 822. 
 321 See generally id. at 821; Lesmeister, 242 B.R. 920. 
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seem “so rooted” in the prebankruptcy past so as to constitute property of the 
bankruptcy estate.322 
The only case discussing § 553 in this factual bucket is Gibson, which 
holds that a debt arises prepetition when the debt is “absolutely owing” on the 
petition date.323 Although the application was filed postpetition, applying for a 
payment does not, without more, make the government’s liability for the 
payment a postpetition debt.324 Rather, a debt is “absolutely owed” when the 
debtors satisfy all requirements for obtaining payment under the government 
program.325 Gibson appears to indicate that the § 553 analysis has a clearer rule 
than § 541(a) analysis.326 
Using the “absolutely owed” Gibson rule in the § 541(a) context may help 
place emphasis on the necessary factual inquiry. Under both §§ 541 and 553, a 
debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment when all requirements 
necessary for payment are satisfied. For example, under SURE, a debtor is 
entitled to payment when he possesses insurance, experiences a qualifying 
loss, and the county he resides in is designated a primary disaster area.327 All 
requirements will be satisfied and the payment will be absolutely owed when 
these conditions are satisfied. This fact-intensive approach should produce 
more consistent results, in line with the language and temporal limitations of 
the Code.328 
C. Postpetition Legislation and Postpetition Application Date 
Case law in the postpetition legislation and postpetition application fact 
pattern varies greatly, largely hinging upon whether a court believes Segal’s 
“so rooted” test survived passage of the Code.329 Early cases such as Lemos 
found the purpose-based approach of Segal to apply and control analysis.330 In 
Lemos, the court held that the government payments at issue resulted from 
 
 322 See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966). 
 323 See In re Gibson, 308 B.R. 763, 767‒68 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
 324 Id. at 769. 
 325 Id. at 769–70. 
 326 Compare id. at 766–69, with Lesmeister, 242 B.R. at 923–26. 
 327 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 8. 
 328 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a), 553 (2012). 
 329 Compare Lemos v. Rakozy (In re Lemos), 243 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) (using the “so 
rooted” test), abrogated by In re Stallings, 290 B.R. 777, 781–82 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003), with Drewes v. Vote 
(In re Vote), 276 F.3d 1024, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 2002) (declining to use Segal’s “so rooted” where debtor had a 
“mere hope” to obtain relief). 
 330 See Lemos, 243 B.R. at 99–100. 
BOXOLD GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:12 PM 
2014] GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS 465 
activities and events “so rooted” in the prebankruptcy past that they constituted 
a legal interest under § 541(a)(1).331 Although the authorizing legislation had 
not been passed at the time of the bankruptcy petition, the debtor had a 
contingent interest in the prospect of a federal program being adopted by 
Congress.332 This is in stark contrast to the decisions in Vote, Burgess, and 
Bracewell.333 Taking a literal approach to § 541(a)(1)’s temporal limitation, 
those courts held that a debtor could not have a legal interest in a government 
payment that was not yet authorized by statute at the time of the bankruptcy 
petition.334 Such a prospect was a mere expectancy, and did not constitute a 
contingent interest.335 
Bracewell and Burgess featured divided courts, with vocal dissents. The 
majority in each case rejected Segal’s “so rooted” test, strongly supporting 
Vote’s position that § 541(a)(1)’s temporal limitation controlled the analysis.336 
The dissents, however, viewed § 541(a)(1) differently, noting its broad 
language was intended to bring within property of the estate contingent and 
unmatured claims.337 Furthermore, they found the Code and its legislative 
history to support survival of Segal’s purpose-based approach.338 The dissent 
reasoned that if the crop was lost prepetition, then a crop disaster payment 
authorized by postpetition legislation could still be property of the estate, since 
the events giving rise to the payment were “so rooted” in the prebankruptcy 
past.339 
The pre-Code practices doctrine is a statutory interpretation principle 
stating, “pre-Code practices continue to be valid, unless Congress evinced 
clear intent to depart from them under the Code.”340 Due to this practice, unless 
Segal and its “so-rooted” test is expressly rejected, the case has survived 
passage of the Code and is still valid law. The legislative history of the Code 
states that “[t]he result in Segal v. Rochelle is followed, and the right to a 
 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. at 99. 
 333 Compare id. at 100 (using the “so rooted” test), with Vote, 276 F.3d at 1026–27. 
 334 Vote, 276 F.3d at 1026. 
 335 See id. at 1026–27. 
 336 Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1241‒42 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes (In 
re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 337 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249‒50; Burgess, 438 F.3d at 516‒17. 
 338 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249; Burgess, 438 F.3d at 512. 
 339 See Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1249; Burgess, 438 F.3d at 512. 
 340 Cf. Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a 
Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, at 57 (2006). 
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refund is property of the estate.”341 The dissent and majority opinions in 
Burgess and Bracewell viewed the use of the word “refund” differently. The 
definition of refund in Black’s Law Dictionary is “[t]he return of money to a 
person who overpaid, such as a taxpayer who overestimated tax liability or 
whose employer withheld too much tax from earnings.”342 This definition 
supports the proposition that Congress didn’t intend for Segal to apply to 
government payment programs generally, but rather wanted to limit its reach to 
cases involving refunds for overpayment. 
The legislative history, however, maintains that “[t]he result of Segal v. 
Rochelle is . . . followed.”343 The phrase which follows, “and the right to a 
refund is property of the estate,” seems explanatory, rather than limiting, in 
nature.344 Segal created a very broad “so rooted” test, which, if expressly 
followed would reach beyond the narrow tax refund context.345 The Supreme 
Court, however, denied a petition for certiorari in Bracewell, lending some 
credence to its central holding that a government payment authorized by 
postpetition legislation is not property of the estate.346 This may be because the 
majority reached the correct result in the case even though they were wrong in 
finding Segal did not survive passage of the Code. Under the Segal test and 
§ 541(a)(1)’s temporal limitation, a debtor cannot have a legal interest in a 
government payment not yet authorized by Congress on the date of the 
bankruptcy petition.347 Payment related to a non-existent program seems far 
from “rooted” in the prebankruptcy past.348 
D. Recent Case Law and the Proposed Rule 
The recent case law discussed indicates the need for a clear standard post- 
Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell. In Farmer, as to the SURE payment, the 
involved parties reached a settlement.349 The Gibson rule, however, should 
have resulted in an easy victory for the government. As to the DCP payment in 
 
 341 H.R. REP. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323.  
 342 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1394 (9th ed. 2009). 
 343 H.R. REP. 95-595, at 367. 
 344 Id. 
 345 See generally Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). 
 346 See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2006), cert denied, 549 U.S. 
1301 (2007). 
 347 See Segal, 382 U.S. at 380–81. 
 348 Contra id. at 375. 
 349 Consent Order to Lift Stay and Offset at 1, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 
2012). 
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Farmer, the court found the statutory authorization date to be indicative of 
when USDA’s obligation to the debtor arose.350 This was a strange result, 
especially when one considers the fact that the DCP payment was tied to the 
debtor’s postpetition 2012 crop.351 Finally, in VanderHouwen, the court held 
that “the date of enactment of the crop disaster program is determinative as to 
whether the [crop disaster payment] is property of the bankruptcy estate.”352 
These holdings, which regard the statutory authorization date as determinative 
in §§ 541 and 553 analysis, run afoul of the Code and relevant case law. 
The proposed rule, that a debtor obtains a legal right in a government 
payment when the payment is “absolutely owed,” stresses the necessary factual 
inquiry under §§ 541 and 553, and limits alternative approaches. One such 
approach, which courts seem to be endorsing, is that a right to a government 
payment is created when the legislation authorizing the payment is passed.353 
This argument, however, seems to contradict the Code because it would give 
debtors in certain cases a legal interest in government payments authorized by 
prepetition legislation, but tied to postpetition losses. This stretches the 
language of both §§ 541(a)(1) and 553.354 Under § 541(a)(1) how could the 
debtor possibly have a “legal or equitable interest” in a government payment as 
of the petition date when he has yet to experience a qualifying loss?  
Such a reading would blatantly distort the provision’s temporal limitation, 
and expand the bankruptcy estate’s reach to all government payments 
authorized by prepetition legislation regardless of when the events necessary 
for payment occurred. Cases that apply this rule, such as VanderHouwen, 
misinterpret Vote, Burgess, and Bracewell.355 These cases did not find the 
statutory authorization date to be determinative, and only held that payments 
authorized by postpetition legislation were not property of the estate.356 
A second alternative approach: that a debtor obtains a legal interest in a 
government payment only upon agency approval of the application, is based on 
cases like Mattice and Schneider. In Mattice and Schneider, the type of 
 
 350 In re Farmer, No. 10-09353, 2012 WL 4905480, at *1–2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct, 15, 2012). 
 351 See id. at *1. 
 352 In re VanderHouwen, No. 03-01244, 2010 WL 227679, at *8–9 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
 353 See id. 
 354 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 553 (2012).  
 355 See Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2006); Burgess v. Sikes (In 
re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 507‒08 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 356 Compare Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1247, and Burgess, 438 F.3d at 507‒08, with VanderHouwen, 2010 
WL 227679, at *8–9. 
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government payment program involved required continuing duties to be 
performed by both the debtor and the government.357 The courts in each case 
held that the debtor did not have an interest in the government payment until 
the application was approved by the administering agency.358 But in the 
context of creating a contract, approval and execution of an agreement is a 
condition necessary for eligibility. These cases are consistent with a rule that 
focuses upon when the payment becomes “absolutely owing” and all 
conditions required for payment are satisfied. It is important, however, to keep 
in mind that if the government program at issue is contractual, then approval is 
a necessary condition, and the debtor cannot obtain a legal interest in the 
payment until such approval is obtained. 
The rule that a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment 
when the debt is “absolutely owing” and all requirements for payment are 
satisfied is preferable and is a more accurate interpretation of the Code than the 
alternative approaches. The factual inquiry required by this rule is compatible 
with § 541(a)(1)’s temporal limitation.359 It is also consistent with Segal and 
does away with the need to find Segal superseded by the passage of the Code, 
as the majority opinions in Burgess and Bracewell did.360 
Another aspect of the “absolutely owing” rule that must be addressed is the 
effect of agency discretion on a condition necessary for payment. To help 
guide analysis of this issue, bankruptcy law should look for guidance in 
administrative law. Although administrative law is not dispositive when 
interpreting the statutory provisions of the Code, administrative law is a useful 
and effective guide. 
In administrative law, for purposes of due process, an individual has a 
property right or interest when the agency creates guidelines or standards.361 
The two seminal cases of Perry and Roth illustrate this rule.362 In Roth, the 
public university did and said nothing to give employees an expectation of 
 
 357 See Schneider v. Nazar (In re Schneider), 864 F.2d 683, 685–86 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Mattice, 81 
B.R. 504, 505–07 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987) (duty to not plant crops in exchange for payment). 
 358 See Schneider, 864 F.2d at 685–86; Mattice, 81 B.R. at 505–07. 
 359 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
 360 See generally Bracewell, 454 F.3d at 1241–42; Burgess, 438 F.3d at 498. 
 361 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566–67 (1972); cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 
602–03 (1972).  
 362 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 566–67 (1972); cf. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602–03 (1972) (allowing plaintiff to 
attempt to prove that administrator’s discretion was cabined sufficiently to make his interest in continued 
employment a property interest). 
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continued employment.363 Contrastingly, the public university in Perry issued 
a handbook that led the professor to believe his employment would continue as 
long as his performance was satisfactory.364 The employee fired in Perry may 
have held a property interest because of these enforceable standards, while the 
employee in Roth did not.365 This “enforceable standards” rule can be applied 
in bankruptcy cases when a condition is subject to agency discretion. If there 
are standards guiding that discretion at the time of the bankruptcy petition, then 
the condition can be regarded as satisfied. If no such standards exist then the 
condition is subject to the agency’s pure unbridled discretion, rendering the 
condition unsatisfied and leaving the debtor with no legal interest at the time of 
the petition. Such a rule could provide useful guidance to bankruptcy courts 
considering whether government payments subject to agency discretion are 
property of the estate under § 541(a)(1), or subject to setoff under § 553. 
E. Application to SURE 
Applying the proposed framework to SURE demonstrates its efficacy, and 
resolves a number of the issues posed by the SURE program. The first step is 
to determine when a payment under SURE becomes “absolutely owing,” and 
all requirements necessary for payment are satisfied. In the context of SURE 
payments, all requirements are met in most cases when: (1) the farmer suffers 
the necessary crop loss; (2) the farmer possesses USDA crop insurance; and 
(3) the crop is located in a Secretarial Designated Disaster County.366 If all 
three requirements are met prepetition, then the payment is “absolutely owed” 
and is property of the bankruptcy estate under § 541, or can be subject to setoff 
under § 553. The third condition often takes months, and may occur 
postpetition, presenting a temporal issue.367 If the Secretary Disaster 
Designation does occur postpetition, analysis then turns to the administrative 
law framework, focusing on whether the USDA created enforceable standards 
to guide agency discretion. 
 
 363 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 566–67. 
 364 Perry, 408 U.S. at 600. 
 365 Compare Roth, 408 U.S. at 568 (explaining that there was no expectation for employee to assume that 
he had property right in his employment continuing), with Perry, 408 U.S. at 600–01 (showing that by 
providing employee guidelines and a handbook, employer created enforceable standards by which to follow if 
it wanted to release employee).  
 366 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 8. 
 367 See Motion to Lift Stay and for Offset at 2, In re Farmer, No. 10-09353 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 
2012); News Release, supra note 10.  
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The SURE program’s statutory and regulatory language provides the 
Secretary of Agriculture with little guidance as to when to designate a county 
as a Secretarial Designated Disaster County.368 The regulations are so 
subjective that they do not seem to create an expectation that a designation will 
be granted.369 Although the new regulations provide for automatic designation 
when certain drought levels are reached, discretion remains in a large number 
of other cases.370 This discretion with no enforceable guidelines or standards 
means that when a disaster designation is made postpetition, a SURE payment 
would not be property of the estate under § 541, or subject to setoff under 
§ 553.371 This matters a great deal to creditors, who would not be entitled to 
distribution of these funds. The overall effect may seem harsh to creditors, but 
the proposed framework is effective, clear, and is the most accurate 
interpretation of the Code. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has argued that a government payment becomes property of 
the estate when a government payment is (1) “absolutely owed” and (2) 
enforceable standards limit agency discretion. Recent case law has regarded 
the date the authorizing legislation was signed into law as determinative of 
when a debtor obtains a legal interest in a government payment. This approach 
misinterprets case law and the language of §§ 541 and 553. The proper 
standard should focus on when a government payment is “absolutely owed,” 
and all requirements for payment are met. This standard emphasizes the 
necessary factual inquiry required by both provisions and can be applied to 
assistance- and contract-based government programs alike. 
Furthermore, if a condition required for payment is subject to agency 
discretion on the date of the petition, administrative law should help guide the 
analysis. Perry and Roth indicate that for the purposes of due process, an 
individual obtains a property interest in a government payment when an 
agency creates enforceable guidelines or standards. If this framework is 
adopted going forward, it can help guide analysis and reduce litigation related 
to government payments under §§ 541 and 553. The proposed result may not 
be comprehensive, but it is a step in the right direction and should provide 
 
 368 See 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20 (2013). 
 369 See 7 C.F.R. § 1945.20 (“[T]he Secretary . . . [shall] consider whether a [disaster] determination 
should be made . . . .”).  
 370 See 7 C.F.R. § 759. 
 371 See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), 553 (2012). 
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